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Confessions--Right to Counsel
Before Trial: The Indigent
Defendant
Roy MomLAND*
The law on confessions, while the accused is in custody after
arrest but before trial, has had a two part development. The
first part developed out of the practice of confining accused
persons for several days before the examining trial,' during
which time confessions were often obtained through coercion.
While the law accepts voluntary confessions,2 coerced confessions
are in violation of the fifth amendment to the federal constitution
and similar state constitutional provisions which prohibit self-
incrimination. Having attacked the long delay before the exam-
ining trial in a number of federal court cases, the Supreme Court
developed in the two leading cases of McNabb v. United States3
and Mallory v. United States4 the federal rule 5 that, if the ex-
* Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law; LL.B., University
of Kentucky; J.D., University of Chicago; S.J.D., Harvard University Law School.
1 Generally such long delays before the examining trial occurred while the
accused was incarcerated, though occasionally the police did not even book the
defendant or lodge him in a cell. They took him instead to a hotel or some other
place where they could operate in private. The following is a some-what extreme
illustration: A filling station on West Third Street in Lexington, Kentucky, was
robbed at night and the operator killed. The local police questioned the last dozen
customers, but they turned up nothing. Then three days later one of these
customers called the police saying he had been kidnapped, presumably by the
killers, and taken to Tennessee. The Lexington police brought him back, but
took him to Louisville, where they held him for three days in a hotel room, tore
up his story, and got a confession. He received a long prison sentence. So many
facts were brought out against him at the trial as to indicate that he was guilty,
but the story indicates the problem which the McNabb-Mallory rule (discussed
infra in the text) attempts to solve.
2 See Curtis v. Commonwealth, 226 S.W.2d 753, 754 (1949) and cases cited
therein.
3 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
4354 U.S. 449 (1957).
5 TheMcNabb-Mallory rule is not binding on state courts but they are, of
course, free to adopt the rule on their own. No state, however, has done so.
Michigan appeared to do so in People v. Hamilton, 359 Mich. 410, 102 N.W.2d
(Continued on next page)
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amining trial were too long delayed, a confession during that
period was presumptively coerced. Although this rule was help-
ful, its effectiveness was limited by the amount of coercion the
police could effect in a short period of time, as pointed out in a
Kentucky Law Journal student note' cited in a dissenting opinion
in Crooker v. California.7
The McNabb-Mallory rule's failure to stop coercion occa-
sioned the second development in the law on confessions-the
requirement of the presence of counsel at all questioning while
the accused is in custody. As developed, this right was first
enforced on interrogation between the time of arrest and the
preliminary examination. Apparently, it is now applicable through
the time of trial.8
To understand and appreciate the development of the re-
quirement that an attorney must be present at confessions while
the accused is in custody, one must realize the prevalence of the
coerced confession in its various forms and intensities prior to
the rule. No attempt will be made to parade a series of illustra-
tions of the practice here. The books are full of examples. 9
Nor will an attempt be made to restate a history of the practice; 10
it is well known as one of the sorriest practices in American
criminal procedure. One illustration will be given in an attempt
to point up the falsity of the oft-repeated statement that the
practice was not as common or as severe as rumored. On re-
peated occasions the writer has heard a public address by John
Y. Brown, a defense attorney whose name is well-known all
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
738 (1960) but that case has subsequently been severely criticized. W. LoCMIAIT,
Y. K~maisA, and J. CoPER, CONSTrtToNAL CRnNAL PoCEDUBRE, CASES AND
MATEmIALs, Note 136 (1964). However, were it not for the recent Supreme Court
broadening of the self-incrimination concept and crack-down on the right to
counsel before trial in confession cases, it is believed that the Supreme Court
would have extended the rule under an application of the fourteenth amendment.
But, while the wide extension of the right to counsel before trial has cured a
great part of the evil of coerced confessions, the McNabb-Mallory rule is sound
and still needed, and should be extended to state courts.
6 See Note, Criminal Procedure-Bight to Counsel Prior to Trial, 44 Ky. L. J.
103 (1955).
7 357 U.S. 433, 445 (1958).
8 At least in the case of felonies, it has long been the rule that the accused
is entitled to counsel on the trial and appeal.
9 See, for example, Note, The Third Degree, 43 HAnV. L. REV. 617 (1930);
Lunt, The American Inquisition, ScuMNuAns MAGAZINE, Jan. 1931, at 57.
10 See the short discussion, Note, The Third Degree-Its Historical Back-
ground The Present Law and Recommendations, 43 Ky. L. J. 392 (1954).
[Vol 58
1icar T o CouNsE. BFon TRIAL
over Kentucky, in which he recounted his experiences in his
first criminal case. His task was proving his Negro client's story
that the full confession the prosecution possessed had been
beaten out of him. The young lawyer happened to tell his
problem to a young newspaper man, who has since become a
national figure. The young reporter flush with friendship-and
several drinks-told the attorney that he had witnessed the beat-
ing which resulted in the confession. According to the reporter,
the defendant had been brought into a room with a policeman
holding each arm. A third policeman asked the Negro for a
confession. When the man remained mute, the policeman hit
him with his fist. This brutal interrogation continued until the
accused was upon his knees and had consented to sign a con-
fession. Also present in the room, was a fourth policeman, a
sergeant who later obtained high position in police circles and
in state political circles, a man of high reputation for integrity
who would not be expected to countenance such proceedings.
On the following day the reporter refused to testify to the beating
when the case came to trial because this would be a violation of
confidence-and, besides, he would then be at odds with the
police and unable to get another story from them. A reporter
from an out-of-town newspaper who saw the beating did testify
at the trial and his newspaper fired him the next day. The first
reporter was subpoenaed to corroborate this testimony, but when
asked at the trial whether he had seen the alleged beating he
simply replied, "I was looking out of the window at the time."
Like Pilate who washed his hands! The reporter had kept faith,
but the jury had heard enough. It gave the Negro life, instead
of death, and the case was not appealed.
This historiette is recited to illustrate that the coerced con-
fession was not limited to Chicago and other large cities"' (it
happened here). As stated by Warner:
"Everywhere the formula for successful detective work (was)
that laid down by former Captain Fiaschetti of the New York
City police: 'You get a bit of information, and then you grab
1 1 NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT, REPORT
oN LAWLESSNESS ni LAw ENFoRcEMENT 153 (No. 11 1931), concluded "tT]he
third degree-the inflicting of pain, physical or mental, to extract confessions or
statements is widespread throughout the country."
1969]
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the suspect and break him down. That is how detective work
is done-a general formula."-12
The Supreme Court had discussed the coerced confession
on numerous occasions prior to the new rules, but had been
unable to thwart the evil. The question naturally arises why
the Court did not make a direct attack upon the problem by
adopting the rule that "a confession while the accused is in
custody is inadmissible as evidence unless made in the presence
of an attorney." Such a rule could have been supported by the
due process clauses of the fifth and fourteenth amendments. It
is suggested, however, that such a rule would have been attacked
as an extreme interpretation of due process since, arguably, there
may be due process in many cases without the presence of an
attorney. It would be urged that on occasion confessions are
voluntarily made, without physical or mental coercion (the
police always deny the use of unlawful tactics). However the
coerced confession is constitutionally prohibited not by name
but only by an interpretation of due process clauses, and such
an interpretation would result in reading coercion out of the
case in too many situations.'3 But the right to the assistance of
counsel is specifically enunciated both in the sixth amendment
to the federal constitution and in state constitutions. While
basing the requirement of the presence of an attorney upon
such a constitutional provision does not completely cover the
problem (for example, is an attorney necessarily required in
misdemeanor cases), it does place the rule more directly within
the constitutions than does an extension of the prohibition against
coerced confessions. It is believed that such reasoning underlies
the basing of the approach to the problem of coercion upon the
constitutional right to counsel.
An alternative approach to the evil of the coerced confession,
a construction of the constitutional prohibition against self-
incrimination, may be dismissed upon recalling that the Supreme
Court relied upon that provision for one hundred and fifty
years without stopping the coerced confession.
12Warner, How Can The Third Degree be Eliminated, 1 BL L oF RIn rs
REv. 24, 25 (1942).
13 This is the reasoning of my colleague, Professor Eugene Mooney, College
of Law, University of Kentucky, with which I agree.
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Admitting, then, the prevalence of the coerced confession
and the necessity of taking a new approach to a solution of
the problem, an examination will be made of the leading cases
enunciating the new federal rule that an attorney must be
present during custodial interrogation of an accused person and
of problems involved in implementing the rule. The presence
of an attorney has long been required at the trial, particularly
in felony cases. The importance of the McNabb-Mallory ex-
tension of this rule is that while an accused may plead guilty
during a trial, it is prior to the trial that confessions, as such,
are obtained.
The development of the right to counsel by which it was
extended to pretrial facts of criminal procedure was forecast
by Messiah v. United States,14 and Gideon v. Wainwright.5
In Messiah, the accused was not in custody, but was out on
bail after indictment, and had made incriminating statements
to a co-defendant in an automobile which were relayed to the
police through a radio transmitter. The Supreme Court's opinion
that these statements were inadmissable in a federal proceeding
because of the deprivation of counsel in contravention of the
sixth amendment was a somewhat questionable holding since
the statements, although induced by trickery,' 6 were voluntarily
made. In Gideon, the Court held the sixth amendment provision
of right to counsel to be applicable to a state trial in a non-
capital case.
The case which initiated the development that a defendant
in custody cannot be questioned except in the presence of an
attorney was Escobedo v. Illinois.17 In that case, a defendant
14 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
'5 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See also the concurring opinions by justices Douglas
and Stewart in Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959). The ffth amendment
provision prohibiting self-incrimination has also been extended to the states
through the fourteenth amendment. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).16 See On Lee v. U.S., 343 U.S. 747 (1952). In that case, while defendant
was at large on bail, an old acquaintance, and former employee, who was an
undercover agent for the government, talked to him at his place of business and
tricked him into making incriminating statements which were picked up from a
radio transmitter on the person of the agent. The Supreme Court held this was
not ground for a reversal of conviction. The decision was five to four. As in
Messiah the defendant was not in custody, so there was no coercion. Should the
law protect against trickery as well as coercion? It is arguable that it should, but
the criminal law has not reached that level yet, even in the case of the wiretap,
at least where there is no trespass, although a technical violation of the right of
privacy.
17378 U.S. 478 (1964).
1969]
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being held on a felony charge made several attempts to see his
lawyer who, despite his presence and persistence, was refused
access to his client. Escobedo was not advised by the police
of his right to remain silent and, after persistent questioning,
made a damaging statement to an Assistant State's Attorney
which was admitted into evidence at the trial. His conviction
for murder was affirmed by the State Supreme Court. How-
ever, the United States Supreme Court reversed the conviction
enunciating the ambiguous rule that "where a police investiga-
tion is no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect in police custody"
his constitutional rights come into play. Particularly, said the
court, Escobedo had been denied an opportunity to consult
with his counsel and had not been warned of his right to remain
silent. The five to four decision was limited to these two ques-
tions, leaving unanswered a number of problems connected with
custodial interrogation, such as whether the right to counsel at
that procedural stage applies to indigent defendants. The more
definite and inclusive statement of the emerging rule which
was therefore required was attempted by the court two years
later in Miranda v. Arizona.1" In that case the court held that
a suspect in custody "or otherwise significantly deprived of his
freedom" 19 must be advised prior to any questioning, unless
other effective means are adopted, that (1) he has a right to
remain silent; (2) any statement he makes may be used as
evidence against him; and (3) he has the right to an attorney,
either retained or appointed. He may waive these constitutional
rights only by a waiver made "voluntarily, knowingly and
intelligently."
An attorney will almost certainly advise a suspect to remain
silent. So, confessions and statements will be cut down about
75 per cent. But the impact of that result is greatly diminished
18384 U.S. 436 (1966). Although the decision is usually referred to as
Miranda v. Arizona, the case was actually a consolidation of the appeals of four
separate defendants. Each case involved a confession that was introduced at the
trial over the defendant's objections.
19 This, the court stated in a footnote, is what was meant in Escobedo by the
phrase, "when the investigation has focused on the accused." Thus, an ambiguous
phrave in Miranda is substituted for the equally nebulous one in Escobedo. Id.
at 444, n. 4.
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by the fact that at the trial in about two-thirds of these cases,
counsel will advise a guilty plea to a lesser charge. Otherwise,
all these cases would never get tried.
A. BiGar To APPonTED CouNsEL iN MISDEmANOR CASEs.
Whether the right to appoint counsel applies in misdemeanor
cases is unclear. The Supreme Court has never ruled on the
question. It is true that certain members of the court have
uttered language which may be interpreted as supporting the
proposition. Justice Black made no indication that the right to
counsel would be limited to felony cases when he said in
Gideon:
The right of one charged with crime to counsel may not be
deemed fundamental and essential to fair trial in some coun-
tries, but it is in ours.20
Justice Harlan in a concurring opinion said:
The special circumstances rule has been formally abandoned
in capital cases, and the time has now come when it should
be similarly abandoned in non-capital cases, at least as to
offenses which, as the one involved here, carry the possibility
of a substantial prison sentence. (Whether the rule should be
extended to all criminal cases need not now be decided.)21
Of particular interest is Patterson v. Warden,22 per curiam de-
cision during the same term as Gideon, in which the court
vacated an indigent misdemeanant's conviction and remanded
the case "for further consideration in light of Gideon v. Wain-
wright."2
It is important to distinguish the right to appointed counsel
in indigent misdemeanor cases in the federal and state courts.
20 372 U.S. at 344 (1963).
21 Id. at 351.
22 372 U.S. 776 (1963).
23 Id. at 776. Patterson was subsequently granted a new trial. Patterson v.
State, 231 Md. 509, 191 A.2d 746 (1963). Other Supreme Court decisions have
stated by way of dictum that a right to counsel exists "under proper circum-
stances," not limiting the statement to felonies. But the statements occur in felony
cases. See Foster v. Illinois, 332 U.S. 134, 136 (1947); Bute v. Illinois, 333
U.S. 640, 666 (1948).
1969]
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Although the Supreme Court has not decided as to the right
of an indigent misdemeanant to court-appointed counsel, a lower
federal court in a federal prosecution in the District of Columbia
held in a petty misdemeanor case that an indigent misdemeanant
was entitled to appointed counsel on arraignment.24 Further-
more, there is specific federal legislation upon the question. The
Federal Criminal Justice Act of 1964 provides a plan for furnish-
ing federally compensated counsel for indigent misdemeanants
in all but petty cases, the latter being defined as "any mis-
demeanor, the penalty for which does not exceed imprisonment
for a period of six months or a fine of not more than $500 or
both." 5 However, federal court officials have stated unofficially
that, while there are very few petty misdemeanor prosecutions
in federal courts, it is their opinion that an indigent petty mis-
demeanant would be furnished an unpaid, court-appointed
lawyer.
Recently, a number of federal courts have held on habeas
corpus that an indigent misdemeanant has the right to appointed
counsel in a state prosecution. With reasoning based largely on
both the broad language in Gideon and the Supreme Court's
treatment of the Patterson case, such cases repeatedly say that
the fact that the offense is a "petty" misdemeanor makes no
difference. In Harvey v. State of MississippiM6 the defendant
was convicted of "possession of liquor," a misdemeanor punish-
able by a fine of up to $500 and up to 90 days in jail. The
conviction was affirmed on appeal and he brought habeas corpus
in a federal court contending that he had been denied counsel.
The court reversed the conviction quoting Evans v. Rives,27 as
follows:
It is suggested... that the constitutional guaranty of the right
of counsel in a criminal case does not apply except in the case
of 'serious offenses'.. . . [A]s far as the right to the assistance
of counsel is concerned, the constitution draws no distinction
24 Evans v. Rives 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
25 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964). Criminal Justice Act of 1964, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(b)
(1964). Such representation is compensated at a rate not exceeding ten dollars
an hour for time reasonably expended out of court and fifteen dollars an hour for
time in court or before an United States Comnmissioner.
26240 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1965).
27 126 F.2d 633 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
Vol. 58
RiGHr To CoUNSEL BEFORE TnALL
between loss of liberty for a short period and such loss for a
long one.28
In McDonald v. Moore,29 the court refused to make a distinction
as to petty misdemeanors and said: "We are without any
authority authorizing the announcement of a petty offense rule."30
To say that there is no constitutional distinction that can be
based upon the duration of the imprisonment is to make an im-
practical and unnecessary interpretation of the sixth amendment.
It is true that the sixth amendment states that in "all" criminal
prosecutions the accused shall have the right to counsel, but
this was long interpreted as excluding all misdemeanors from
the exercise of the right and on various occasions as distinguish-
ing between petty misdemeanors and those of a higher order.
Constitutions should not necessarily be construed literally. In-
terpretation should always stay within the spirit and purpose of
the instrument, but history, the practicalities of the particular
situation, and changing social mores should also be taken into
consideration. It is unthoughtful, to say the least, to argue that
a short imprisonment in the county jail is as opprobrious as a
long one in the penitentiary. Far greater odium attaches to a
penitentiary sentence, and naturally a short sentence is a lesser
burden than a long one.
The practicalities of the case are probably the determining
factor. There are literally hundreds of these petty misdemeanor
cases which would require free counsel if minor offenses were
to be included in the rule. Traffic cases alone are almost un-
countable. As was said in Brinson v. Florida:31
If Gideon is extended to all misdemeanors, its effect would
be profound and create a tremendous economic and admin-
istrative burden since only a small minority of states now
require appointment of counsel for indigents in misdemeanor
cases. The demands upon the bench and bar would be
staggering and well-nigh impossible. Such a construction
28240 F.2d at 271.
29353 F.2d 106 (5th Cir. 1965).
30Id. at 110. See also Rutledge v. City of Miami, 267 F. Supp. 885 (S.D.
Fla. 1967); Arbo v. Hegstrom 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966); Petition of
Thomas, 261 F. Supp. 263 (W.D. La. 1966).
31273 F. Supp. 840 (S.D. Fla. 1967).
19691
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could lead to the appointment of counsel for misdemeanors
not normally considered criminal, such as overparking and
other petty traffic offenses, jaywalking, dropping trash upon
the sidewalk, and like offenses.3 2
While most decisions extending the right to appointed counsel
in indigent misdemeanor cases in state prosecutions have been
by habeas corpus to the federal courts, some state appellate
courts have extended the right in such cases. In an appeal from
a municipal court prosecution in In Re Johnson,3 the California
appellate court cited Gideon and a rather broad state constitu-
tional provision in holding that one accused of driving with a
revoked license was entitled to counsel. In People v. Witenski, 4
the New York appellate court held that three youths accused of
stealing a half bushel of apples "of the value of $2" were entitled
to counsel in proceedings before the justice of the peace. The
decision was four to three, with the majority opinion insisting
on the ease of securing court-appointed counsel, and the minority
opinion more forcefully, and more accurately, pointing out the
difficulty of securing attorneys to defend indigent petty mis-
demeanants in justice of the peace courts.
While some state appellate courts have extended the right
to appointed counsel in indigent misdemeanor cases, and while
some federal courts have recognized the right in state prosecu-
tions on habeas corpus, a number of state courts have refused
to recognize the right and the decisions did not go to the federal
courts on habeas corpus. In Fish v. State, 5 the Florida appellate
court held that an indigent accused of committing a misdemeanor
was not entitled to appointed counsel. The fact that the Florida
legislature had provided for a public defender in all indigent
felony cases influenced the decision. The Supreme Court of
Louisiana held in State v. Thomas36 that Gideon is inapplicable
to misdemeanors. In State v. Zucconi,37 a New Jersey traffic case,
the appellate court held that the Miranda requirement of counsel
32 Id. at 845. The court nevertheless felt bound by Harvey and McDonald
federal fifth circuit decisions, and ordered the release of the defendant as having
been denied counsel.
33 42 Cal. 228, 398 P.2d 420 (1965).
34 15 N.Y.2d 392, 207 N.E.2d 358 (1965).
35 159 So.2d 866 (Fla. 1964).
36249 La. 742, 190 So.2d 909 (1966).
37 93 N.J. Super. 380, 226 A.2d 16 (App. Div. 1967).
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did not apply in a state prosecution of an indigent misdemeanant.
In State v. Sherron,38 the North Carolina appellate court held
that an indigent misdemeanant's right to appointed counsel is
not absolute, but is dependent upon such circumstances as the
gravity of the offense. In Sherron, the denial of free counsel
was affirmed although the defendant was convicted of malicious
injury to personal property. In a similar North Carolina case
brought on habeas corpus, the Federal District Court for the
Eastern District of North Carolina held in one of the best
written analyses of the relevant cases that the gravity of the
offense and other circumstances determine the right to appointed
counsel in an indigent misdemeanor case.39
The general variance between state and federal holdings is
well illustrated by Winters v. Beck.40 The defendant was con-
victed of immorality, a misdemeanor by city ordinance, and his
punishment was fixed at 30 days, with a fine of $254 including
costs. The appellate court affirmed the conviction, stating that
indigents have always had court-appointed counsel in felony
cases but that "thousands of misdemeanor cases are tried in the
Municipal Courts of Pulaski County annually' and in many of
these cases the defendants are not represented by counsel. The
court refused to follow Gideon where "the court was dealing
with a felony case." The United States Supreme Court denied
certiorari,41 but the defendant subsequently obtained a writ of
habeas corpus from a federal court 42 which said that, while
the charge was not in itself serious enough to require the ap-
pointment of counsel, the interaction of the "dollar-a-day" state
statute with a $254 fine to be satisfied by confinement, if unpaid,
plus a thirty day jail sentence constituted an offense serious
enough to require the appointment of counsel.4
The federal-state variance is further illustrated by Dejoseph
v. State.4 The defendant was charged with failure to support
his wife and children, a misdemeanor punishable by a maximum
38 268 N.C. 694, 151 S.E.2d 599 (1966).
39 Creighton v. North Carolina, 257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. N. C. 1966).
40239 Ark. 1151, 397 S.W.2d 364 (1966).
41385 U.S. 907 (1966).42 Winters v. Beck, 281 F. Supp. 793 (W.D. Ark. 1968).
4 3 This kind of reasoning would throw most petty misdemeanors into the
"serious offense" category, since indigent defendants presumably are unable to
pay fines.
44 222 A.2d 752 (1966).
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of not more than one year's confinement in jail, and was convicted
without counsel. The Connecticut appellate court affirmed the
conviction and certiorari was denied45 despite the result in Arbo
v. Hegstrom46-a factually similar Connecticut case in which a
federal court released the defendant on habeas corpus.
A case which further complicates the indigent defense prob-
lem by adding a new facet and an approach by the Supreme
Court somewhat contrary to its treatment of Patterson is In
Re Gault. This case,47 which is the basis of the new rule that
a juvenile may be entitled to free counsel in a Juvenile Court
proceeding, does not require that counsel must be offered in all
cases. What the case held is that the due process clause of the
fourteenth amendment requires that in juvenile proceedings to
determine delinquency which may result in commitment to an
institution, the child and his parents must be notified that he
will be supplied counsel if unable to pay for such service. The
court said that such a proceeding is comparable to a felony
prosecution. This may be taken as an over-statement when the
analogy is applied to some juvenile cases where the juvenile
is entitled to free counsel; but the fact remains that the new
rule, still somewhat undefined, permits the juvenile to have
appointed counsel in "serious cases," according to juvenile court
standards.48
According to Judge Gardner Turner, the Juvenile Court of
Fayette County, Kentucky seems to be following this interpreta-
tion of In Re Gault. Juvenile court defenders defend all juveniles
where a petition is filed under section 208.070 of the Kentucky
Revised Statutes and there is a formal hearing, and perhaps in
some other cases where the informal hearing indicates a "serious
offense." In non-serious charges no attorney is furnished and
the proceeding is informal.
The variance which produces the confession and contradic-
tion surrounding such cases as Winters, Deloseph and Gault
45385 U.S. 982 (1966).
46 261 F. Supp. 397 (D. Conn. 1966).
47 387 U.S. 1 (1967).48 
"Recently, the Fayette County Fiscal Court appointed two public defenders
to be assigned to Juvenile Court. These attorneys each are paid $250.00 per month
for their services and will defend indigent defendants in all cases in which a
petition has been filed and a formal hearing held." Gardner Turner, Judge, Juvenile
Court, Fayette County, Kentucky.
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is occasioned by the fact that the Supreme Court49 is probably
in favor of meeting the issue, but the division of both the Court
and public opinion on the matter has caused the Court to with-
hold any decision.50 Meanwhile, the lower federal courts and
the state appellate courts maintain generally conflicting views
on the question, perhaps because the federal courts in such
cases do not have to face the problem of implementation. If
indigent defendants are furnished counsel for free, the program
must be implemented either through the "voluntary" services of
attorneys or through federal and/or state tax money. Federal
tax money has been readily available for the past decade; new
and additional state taxes are more difficult to obtain. Another
possible explanation is that state appellate courts are somewhat
disposed to think that if a convicted defendant did not have
"justice" in the procedures below, it will show up on the record
and a new trial can be ordered. Such thinking relies strongly
on the ability of the trial judge to use his discretion and rectify
matters if need be.51
B. ImPLEMENTATION OF RIGHT TO COUNSEL IN INDIGENT
MISDEMEANOR CASES.
A decision that a defendant needs a lawyer immediately on
arrest, and continuously thereafter, in every criminal case does
not solve the problem of the indigent defendant. There remains
the almost insurmountable problem of implementing such pro-
fessional services. Lawyers must make a living just like other
citizens and if an attorney works for free for an indigent, he
must either charge his paying clients more than he otherwise
would or suffer a loss in his income, unless he is compensated
by the government or some foundation. It is as simple as that.
To say that lawyers owe a duty to defend the indigent
49 Justices Stewart, Black and Douglas. See De Joseph v. Connecticut, 385
U.S. 982 (1966) (dissenting from denial of certiorari).50 In an excellent Case Comment, 19 CASE WESTERN E . L. REv. 367, 370
(1968), the writer makes much of this variance between the Supreme Court
and some federal courts. The fact remains that opinions vary as to the right of
an indigent misdemeanant to court-appointed counsel, and the Supreme Court,
quite correctly perhaps, refuses to make a decision on the matter.
51 See Creighton v. North Carolina, 257 F. Supp. 806 (E.D. N. Car. 1966),
which discusses this reasoning as embodied in the North Carolina rule. The
success of the rule seems doubtful in light of past experience.
KENTucKy LAw JouNAL[
gratuitously because they are members of the bar is a cliche.
Actually, free service to the poor by lawyers is an historic survivor.
Historically, doctors and lawyers come from the moneyed class;
they had inherited substantial incomes and so were able, and
felt it a duty, to render community service. But times have
changed. Doctors and lawyers now come from all segments of
society. In their practice, most of them have no income other
than the moneys they receive as compensation from patients
and clients. Consequently, doctors have gradually quit prac-
tically all free service. Try to get a doctor to render free services
to an indigent member of the communityl Today practically
all such care is compensated for by the city, county, state, and
federal governments.
Why have doctors been able to unburden themselves of
this so-called professional obligation while lawyers have not?
There are those who say that lawyers' charges are high so they
are able to absorb this burden. But doctors charge more highly
for their services than lawyers, as do plumbers and electricians.
The question is, why have doctors been able to convince the
public that it is not fair or right that they should render free
services while lawyers, who are also skilled professionals with
strict and lengthy education requirements, have not been able
to do so? It is believed it is because judges have had the power
and authority to enforce continuation of the historic practice.
With no authoritative judges presiding over the medical pro-
fession, medical associations have gradually allowed the practice
to be discontinued.
If the proposition that lawyers have no greater "duty" to
render gratuitous services to the indigent than have doctors and
others is accepted, the problem is still unsolved, for such services
are needed. It would appear, then, that the only solution to the
problem is to provide compensation for them out of taxes, state
and federal, supplemented to some extent by "intern" services
of law school students and occasional grants from foundations.
Furthermore, if it has become necessary to add compensation
to lawyers for services to the poor to the tax burden, it becomes
necessary to give serious consideration to the amount and extent
of such services. Shall they extend to misdemeanors? There
are literally hundreds of these before the courts every week.
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An attorney is appointed to defend a misdemeanant. He sits
for two hours before his case is called. His whole afternoon
is wasted.
The Supreme Court not having decided the question, the
draftsmen of statutory provisions for compensating such services
must turn to Congressional and state legislative enactments for
guidance. At the federal court level there is the Federal Criminal
Justice Act of 1968 providing for the furnishing of paid counsel
for all felony cases and in all but petty misdemeanors, 52 the
latter being an offense the penalty for which does not exceed
imprisonment for six months or a fine of $500 or both.5 3 The
state statutes which furnish legal service to indigent defendants
vary greatly.
A most conservative approach is the Florida public defender
system composed of two related acts54 which provide com-
pensated counsel to adult defendants other than misdemeanants
and to juvenile defendants who request such assistance and are
granted it by the judge. These statutes are an apparent attempt
to comply exactly with only the minimum requirements of the
fourteenth amendment expressed in Gideon and Gault. However,
it may well be doubted whether Gault is satisfied, since the act
provides that counsel to the juvenile shall be supplied if he
requests an attorney and the court on its own motion appoints
one. Miranda,"5 which laid down the guideline for the appoint-
ment of counsel to indigents, specifically provides that the ac-
cused must be affirmatively told that he may have counsel if
indigent. It should be pointed out, however, that the Florida
act would exceed Gault in one facet, since the indigent's "request"
may be for an attorney in a less "serious offense" than specified
in Gault.
Kentucky statutes are also very conservative, but go slightly
beyond the Florida acts to provide services to the indigent in
certain high misdemeanors. The Kentucky Rules of Criminal
Procedure provide:
If the crime of which the defendant is charged is punishable
by a fine of more than $500 or by confinement for more than
5218 U.S.C. § 3006 A(b) (1964).
53 18 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
54 FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 909.21 and 27.51 (Supp. 1963).55 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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12 months, the examining court shall appoint counsel to repre-
sent him in the preliminary proceeding unless he elects to
proceed without counsel or is able to obtain counsel.
* * 0 *
If on arraignment or thereafter, in felony cases, the de-
fendant appears in court without counsel, the court shall
advise him of his right to counsel, and shall assign counsel
to represent him at every stage of the proceedings unless he
elects to proceed without counsel or is able to obtain
counsel. 56
There is apparent ambiguity when these two rules are read
together. An indigent misdemeanant charged with an offense
punishable by a fine of more than $500 and for confinement for
more than twelve months is entitled to appointed counsel at
the preliminary proceedings who supposedly serves during the
subsequent interval before arraignment and trial. But at that
point the second rule would become operative and, since it
applies only to felonies, the defendant would thereupon be with-
out appointed counsel. It is, however, understood that despite
the statutory contradiction, it is the practice that counsel ap-
pointed at the examining trial shall continue to serve at the
arraignment and during the trial.57 It should also be pointed out
that the Kentucky act goes further than the Florida provisions
in that some high misdemeanors are punishable by more than
twelve months in jail and/or a $500 fine and are therefore
covered, whereas the Florida acts are limited to felony cases
except in the case of juveniles.
Forty-four states have adopted public defender programs of
various types.5 s Some have purely defender systems; others have
only private counsel with compensation set by the court; others
have combinations of the two.5 9 Forty states have statutory
5 6 Ky. R. Cuim. P. 3.08(2); id. 8.04.
57 For example, this is the practice in the Fayette Circuit Court, Fayette
County, Kentucky.58 Note, Attorney's Fees for Indigent Criminal Defendants, 55 Ky. L.J. 707,
710 (1967).
59 Justice Douglas in a dissenting opinion to Hackin V. Arizona, 389 U.S.
143, 145 (1967), maintains that the legal problems of the poor are too numerous
to be handled by lawyers alone. His dissent, buttressed by copious footnotes takes
the quasi-political position that social workers, members of health professions, and
other non-lawyer aids need to assist in solving the legal problems of the poor, of
which defense of the indigent in criminal cases is only a small part.
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provisions for compensation of counsel in such cases. 60 Such
facts indicate the amount of thought and action that have been
centered on the problem. Those states in which there is no com-
pensation for attorneys in indigent cases are: Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Missouri, South Carolina, Tennessee and Utah.6 ' Note,
especially, that Kentucky is one of these.
The thesis of this article has been that an accused person in
a criminal case has the need of counsel at least from the moment
of his arrest. However, this need is limited by practical exigencies.
A balance must be struck between what might be thought to
be an ideal situation and what it is socially possible to achieve.
One who proposes indigent defender legislation must keep in
mind the willingness and ability of taxpayers to pay for the
suggested program and whether the legislature will adopt and
implement it.
It is with such thoughts in mind that the following indigent
defender statute is proposed for the consideration of the pro-
fession and the legislature. In scope and in administrative pro-
cedure it is based primarily on the Public Defender Acts of
Florida and on the bill which failed passage by the 1968 Ken-
tucky legislature. Some features of these Acts have been adapted
to the proposed statute and some different ones have been sug-
gested. An attempt has been made to make the public defender
correspond to the commonwealth attorney and the juvenile court
defender correspond to the county attorney in the methods of
election and manner of compensation.
0 a * a
AN ACT ELATING TO PuBLIc DEFENDm s.
BE IT ENACTED BY THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF THE
COMMONWEALTH OF KENTUCKY:
Section 1. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
60 Grove, Gideon's Trumpet: Taps For An Antiquated System?, 54 Ky. L.J.
527, 544 (1966) listing state statutes. This exhaustive article, indicating much
thought and research, is unfortunate in that its conclusion calls for a Defender
Committee consisting of the judges of the Court of Appeals, the deans of the law
schools of the Commonwealth, and a representative of the state bar association
with the Chief Justice serving as Chairman. It would be the duty of this Committee
to administer the details of the Act. It is submitted that such an administrative
(Continued on next page)
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(1) There shall be a public defender elected at the same
time and in the same manner as the commonwealth attorney
for a term of four years for each circuit court district in which
there is a city of the first or second class. The public defender
shall be at least twenty-four years of age at the time of his
election, a citizen of Kentucky, a resident of the state for two
years and of the district for which he is elected for one year
next preceding his election, and a licensed practicing attorney
for three years.
(2) The public defender shall represent any person who
is determined to be insolvent as provided by this act, who is
under arrest for, or is charged with, a felony within the juris-
diction of the circuit court, and who, upon being advised he
has a right to such public defender, requests it, or if the court
on its own motion so orders and such person does not knowingly,
understandingly, and intelligently waive the right to be so repre-
sented. The clerk of the court conducting such proceedings is
directed to make such proceedings a matter of record.
(3) The public defender shall perform all duties necessary
for the prosecution of an appeal to the Court of Appeals at the
request of any person determined to be indigent as provided by
section 4 of this act, or at the request of the Court of Appeals
to prosecute an appeal or any post-conviction remedy in behalf
of such person before that court, if the public defender is frst
satisfied that there is arguable merit to the proceeding.
Section 2. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
(1) There shall be a juvenile court defender elected at the
same time and in the same manner as the county attorney for
a term of four years for each circuit court district in which there
is a city of the first or second class. The juvenile court defender
shall be at least 24 years of age at the time of his election, a
citizen of Kentucky, a resident of the state for two years and of
the district for which he is elected for one year next preceding
his election, and a licensed practicing attorney for three years.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
procedure would be totally ineffective. All these individuals have heavy primary
official duties and also serve in other public service and so could not add the
administration of a Public Defender Act to their responsibilities.
61 Supra note 60, at 544 n. 59.
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(2) The juvenile court defender shall represent any juven-
ile who is determined to be insolvent as provided by this act,
who is under arrest or is charged with a criminal offense within
the jurisdiction of the juvenile court, and who upon being ad-
vised he has a right to such juvenile defender requests it, or if
the court on its own motion so orders and such juvenile does
not knowingly, understandingly, and intelligently waive the right
to be so represented. The clerk of the court conducting such
proceedings is directed to make such proceedings a matter of
record.
Section 3. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
(1) The salary of the public defender in a county containing
three or more divisions of circuit court shall be ($9500?) per
year; in other counties it shall be ($7200?) per year. In a county
containing a city of the first class the public defender may have
one assistant with the qualifications set out in subsection (1)
of this act, who shall receive a salary of ($6000?) per year.
(2) The salary of the juvenile court defender in a county
containing three or more divisions of circuit court shall be
($5000?) per year. In other counties it shall be ($3500?) per
year.
(3) A public defender and a juvenile court defender shall
receive an expense allowance of $100 per month to defray office
expenses.
(4) Salaries and expenses authorized by this act shall be
paid as are salaries and expenses of the commonwealth attorney
and county attorney, respectively.
(5) The public defender and juvenile court defender shall
give priority and preference to their duties under the provisions
of this act and may engage in the private practice of law only
to the extent that it will not interfere with or prevent performance
of their duties under this act and shall not otherwise engage in
the practice of criminal law.
Section 4. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
The public defender or the juvenile court defender may,
with the consent of the court, but without compensation by
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the state or county, accept the voluntary services of members
of the Kentucky bar in good standing in the defense of an in-
solvent person.
Section 5. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
(1) The determination of insolvency of any person shall
be made by the court and may be done at any stage of the
proceedings. The public defender or the juvenile court defender
shall be allowed process of the court to summon witnesses to
testify before the court concerning the financial ability of any
accused person to employ counsel in his own defense.
(2) If the court shall determine and adjudge within one
year after the determination of insolvency, that the accused
was erroneously or improperly determined to be insolvent, the
commonwealth attorney or the county attorney may, in the name
of the state, proceed against the accused for the reasonable
value of the services rendered to the accused, including all
costs paid by the state or county in his behalf. Any amount
recovered shall be deposited in the general revenue or county
general fund to the account from which the expenses of the
office of public defender or juvenile court defender are paid.
Section 6. A new section of the Kentucky Revised Statutes
is created to read:
There is hereby created a lien, enforceable as hereinafter
provided, upon all the property both real and personal of any
person who is receiving or has received any assistance from
any public defender or juvenile court defender of the state or
county. Such assistance shall constitute a claim against the
applicant and his estate, enforceable according to law in an
amount to be determined by the court in which such assistance
was rendered. Immediately after such assistance is rendered
and upon determination of the value thereon by the court, a
statement of claim showing the name and residence of the
recipient shall be filed for record where the recipient resides
and in each county in which each recipient then owns or later
acquires any property. Said liens shall be enforced on behalf
of the state or county by the several public defenders and
juvenile court defenders, and shall be utilized to reimburse the
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state or county to defray the costs of the public and juvenile
court system. The lien herein created shall be a continuing
obligation, irrespective of any statute of limitations.
To recapitulate, there are several salient features about this
suggested statute:
(1) An attempt is made to provide defenders only for
felonies and for criminal offenses by juveniles. These are the
only categories in which an indigent defendant is entitled to
free counsel under existing Supreme Court decisions, and the
only categories to which a pragmatic proposal can extend.
(2) In accord with the bill submitted to the 1968 legislature,
a public defender is provided only for circuit court districts in
which there is a city of the first or second class. Therefore,
most counties will not be affected by the statute and will have
only those defenders appointed by the court to serve without
pay. It is a matter of money. How far will the legislature go
at this time?
(3) An attempt is made to make the methods of election
and compensation of the public defenders parallel to those of
the commonwealth and county attorneys,62 respectively. It is
felt that this has a number of advantages over other systems of
appointment 63 and compensation, 4 particularly over the 1968
bill's system of putting these matters in the judicial council.
62 There is an excellent discussion of the method of determining the compensa-
tion of the county attorney in Kentucky in the recent case of Dennis v. Rich,
434 S.W.2d 632 (Ky. 1968).
03 U.S.C. § 3006A (1964).
64 Not only did the 1968 legislature fail to pass an indigent defendant bill but
the 1964 legislature failed to pass one providing for payment of assigned counsel
according to the crime. See Matthews, Payment of the Unfee'd Lawyer, 28 Ky.
ST. B. J. 18 (1964).
